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BILINGUAL EDUCATION-A PROBLEM OF
"SUBSTANTIAL" NUMBERS?
I. Introduction
It is generally agreed that learning English is essential to eco-
nomic and social mobility in an English speaking society.' The Bil-
ingual Education Act2 provides for the federal funding of compensa-
1. STAFF OF SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., TowARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 4 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter cited as
SEN. SELECT COMM.].
The United States Office of Education estimated in 1975 that at least five million children
needed remedial English language programs. U.S. COMM'N ON CwIv RIGHTS, A BETrER CHANCE
TO LEARN: BILINGUAL BICULTURAL EDUCATION 13 (1975) [hereinafter cited as A BETTER CHANCE
TO LEARN.].
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 880b-880b-13 (Supp. V, 1975). The Bilingual Education Act, Title VII
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, provides for aid to "local education agen-
cies" or an "institution of higher education" that elects to participate in a compulsory lan-
guage program. 20 U.S.C. § 880b-7 (Supp. V, 1975). Section 880b-7(a) provides:
Funds available for grants under this part shall be used for-
(1) the establishment, operation, and improvement of programs of bilingual educa-
tion;
(2) auxiliary and supplementary community and educational activities designed to
facilitate and expand the implementation of programs described in clause (1), includ-
ing such activities as (A) adult education programs related to the purposes of this
subchapter, particularly for parents of children participating in programs of bilin-
gual education, and carried out, where appropriate, in coordination with programs
assisted under the Adult Education Act, and (B) preschool programs preparatory and
supplementary to bilingual education programs ...
In 1974 Congress expanded the eligibility requirements of the statute to include schools
which did not have a high concentration of children from families with incomes less than
$3000 a year or from families receiving social security benefits under the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children Program. Act of August 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 105(a)(1), 88
Stat. 503. The former requirements were found at 20 U.S.C. § 880b-2 (1970), which expired
on June 30, 1975.
In order to be eligible for federal funds, the local education agency or institution of higher
education must enter into an agreement with the Commissioner of Education. 20 U.S.C. §
880b-7(b)(1) (Supp. V, 1975). The agreement can only be approved after the Commissioner
has consulted with the state educational agency in order to achieve an "equitable distribution
of assistance" within the state based on the following factors:
(i) the geographic distribution of children of limited English-speaking ability, (ii) the
relative need of persons in different geographic areas within the State for the kinds of
services and activities described in [20 U.S.C. § 880b-7 (a)] of this section, (iii) with
respect to grants to carry out programs described in [20 U.S.C. §§ 880b-7(a)(1)-(2)]
of this section, and (iv) with respect to such grants, the relative numbers of persons
from low-income families sought to be benefitted by such programs ....
Id. § 880-7(b)(2)(A). An applicant for federal funds must also agree to abide by the HEW
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tory language programs to assist children in learning English. Nu-
merous class action suits have been instituted on behalf of language
minority students against school districts to obtain these remedial
programs.' These suits alleged violations of section 601 of the Civil
Rights Act of 19641 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d), and the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Educators have proposed two main methods to compensate for
the language deficiencies of non-English speaking students.' The
first type of program is called the "English as a Second Language"
(ESL) approach.7 ESL programs employ English as the language of
instruction for courses such as science or social studies.' Addition-
ally, in a typical ESL plan, non-English speaking students attend
a class to develop their English language skills.' ESL programs are
most beneficial to language minority children in a transitional stage
from their native language to English.'"
The second main plan, termed "bilingual/bicultural" education,
is significantly different from the ESL approach." In a bilingual/
bicultural program, children are taught in their native language.'2
Under this program, children also receive instruction in English
language skills as a separate class."3 Another distinguishing facet
of the bilingual/bicultural approach is its emphasis on the re-
tention of the child's native historical, literary and cultural tradi-
tions." Advocates of the bilingual/bicultural program contend that
the rejection of a child's native language and customs, in an attempt
to teach him English, could result in a psychological trauma by
guidelines. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 123.01-.63 (1976). The Commissioner must give priority in
distributing funds "to areas having the greatest need for [compensatory language] programs
.... .20 U.S.C. § 880b-7(c) (Supp. V, 1975).
3. See text accompanying notes 43-74 infra.
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 56d, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
5. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
6. Inequality in Education, Harv. Center for Law and Educ., Feb. 1975, at 35.
7. A BETTER CHANCE TO LEARN, supra note 1, at 22.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rxv., 56 (1974).
11. SEN. SELECT COMM., supra note 1, at 287.
12. A BETTER CHANCE TO LEARN, supra note 1, at 29.
13. Id.
14. SEN. SELECT COMM., supra note 1, at 286.
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making the child feel inferior.'5 Thus, educators favor the bilin-
gual/bicultural approach when the student does not have the ability
to use English in his studies.'6
Even though the Supreme Court in Lau v. Nichols" held that
language minority students are entitled to receive compensatory
language instruction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, several courts have
concluded that this decision does not require a federally funded
school system to implement special language programs in every
case.'8 This Note will examine the rights of non-English speaking
children under section 2000d and under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
II. The Right to a Compensatory Language Program
In Lau v. Nichols'9 a class action was brought on behalf of non-
English speaking Chinese students against defendant officials of the
San Francisco Unified School District. The existing program of in-
struction in defendants' school district did not accommodate all of
the Chinese students who required special English instruction. '"
Petitioners alleged that this unequal educational opportunity vio-
lated 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.2 '
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the district
court's decision,' 3 found that the petitioners did not state a valid
cause of action under section 2000d or the equal protection clause.',
The court of appeals disposed of the petitioners claim under 42
U.S.C. § 2000d without an opinion.25 In rejecting the petitioners'
15. Id.
16. A BETTER CHANCE TO LEARN, supra note 1, at 78.
17. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
18. See text accompanying notes 45-74 infra.
19. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
20. Id. at 564.
21. Id. at 564-65. The majority opinion, before addressing the merits, noted that petition-
ers did not request any specific relief. Rather, petitioners asked that defendant school officials
be ordered to recognize and make a good faith effort to alleviate the problem. Id.
22. 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973). For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lau,
see 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 122 (1973).
23. Civ. No. C-70 627 (N.D. Cal., May 26, 1970).
24. 483 F.2d at 797.
25. Id. at 794 n.6. Plaintiffs' cause of action based on section 2000d relied on the third
party beneficiary rationale of Lemon v. School Bd., 240 F. Supp 709, 713 (W.D. La. 1965),
aff'd, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
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claim under the equal protection clause, the court stated: "Every
student brings to the starting line of his educational career different
advantages and disadvantages caused in part by social, economic
and cultural background, created and continued completely apart
from any contribution by the school system."2 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit held that the defendants had no duty to take any affirmative
steps to correct inequalities over which they had no control, since
the peitioners were receiving the same education on the same terms
as other students within the school district.27
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority of the Supreme
Court, found that the inability of the Chinese students to under-
stand English foreclosed them from a meaningful education. 8 He
noted that the defendant school district had agreed to comply with
the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and the regulations imposed by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), since it re-
ceived federal funds.29
Section 2000d bans discrimination based "on the grounds of race,
color, or national origin . . . [in] any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."30 Section 2000d-1 authorizes HEW to
issue rules, regulations and order of general applicability effectuat-
ing the objectives of section 2000d.3' The HEW regulations amplify
the anti-discriminatory objectives of section 2000d.32 In 1970 HEW
issued a clarifying memorandum which requires federally funded
school districts to rectify language deficiencies in their schools by
including children with linquistic deficiencies in special language
programs. 3 This memorandum also requires a school district to take
"affirmative steps" as "soon as possible" when the inability of mi-
nority group children to speak and understand English excludes
them from effective participation in the educational program. 4
Relying on the provisions of section 2000d and the HEW regula-
tions, Mr. Justice Douglas concluded that the Chinese students
26. 483 F.2d at 797.
27. Id. at 799.
28. 414 U.S. at 566.
29. Id. at 568-69.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
31. Id. § 2000d-1.
32. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1) (1976).
33. 35 Fed. Reg. 11595 (1970).
34. Id.
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were entitled to receive compensatory language instruction '.3  He
therefore remanded the case so that the district court could take
immediate measures to effectuate the defendants' contractural obli-
gations under the statute and under the HEW regulations.:"
Although Mr. Justice Douglas avoided a constitutional confronta-
tion by granting relief under the statute, he did acknowledge the
possibility of a successful equal protection claim: "Under these
state-imposed standards [for graduation] there is no equality of
treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities,
textbooks, teachers, and curriculum . . . ."1 However, Mr. Justice
Douglas did not indicate if such a claim would be successful under
the facts of Lau.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Blackmun, joined by Mr.
Chief Justice Burger, indicated that he would limit the broad sweep
of the HEW regulations so that special instruction is only required
in certain circumstances." Mr. Justice Blackmun stated that he
would qualify the Court's holding by restricting it to situations in-
volving a "substantial" number of minority children." He con-
cluded that the 1,800 language minority children attending the de-
fendants' school system constituted a "substantial" number.'0 Mr.
Justice Blackmun also indicated that the HEW guidelines would
not require a school district to provide special language instruction
for a few minority children." He concluded that "numbers are at the
heart of this case ... .42
III. Post-Lau Cases: The Problem of "Substantial" Numbers
Most of the cases construing Lau have arisen in Tenth Circuit
35. 414 U.S. at 568-69.
36. Id. at 569.
37. Id. at 566. The court was under no compulsion to consider whether there was an
equal protection violation. When the issue before the court involves alleged violations of both
statutory and constitutional rights, the court may find a violation of statutory rights and give
the relief requested without deciding the constitutional aspect of the issue. See King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309 (1968).
38. Id. at 571-72 (Blackmum, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 572. Mr. Justice Blackmun stated that "when, in another case, we are concerned
with a very few youngsters, or with just a single child ... I would not regard today's decision
... as conclusive upon the issue ..... Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. See generally Sugerman, Equal Protection for Non-English Speaking School Chil-
dren: Lau v. Nichols, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 157, 270 (1974).
1977]
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courts.43 These cases seem to indicate that the Lau decision is lim-
ited by the rationale of Mr. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion,
even though only one other Justice joined in that opinion.4 If other
courts follow this line of reasoning, many language minority chil-
dren may not receive the special instruction needed to pass required
courses which are taught in English.
In Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools,4" Spanish surnamed stu-
dents brought a class action through their parents for alleged statu-
tory and constitutional violations by defendant school district. The
Spanish speaking students comprised 34 percent of the children
attending the district's elementary schools." Plaintiffs' evidence
revealed that defendant school district was not making a sufficient
attempt to rectify the language deficiencies of its students.47
The district court held that defendant's failure to provide a com-
pensatory language program for its Spanish speaking students con-
stituted a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment." On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals exam-
ined the case in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Lau."5
Althought the court of appeals concluded that the district court had
made the proper decision on the equal protection claim,'" it granted
relief under the provisions of section 2000d and the HEW regula-
tions.' Reiterating Mr. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in
Lau, it noted that a violation of section 2000d only exists when a
"substantial" group of language minority students are being de-
prived of a meaningful education. 2 The court did not define what
constitutes a "substantial" group of minority students.
Unlike Lau, the Tenth Circuit in Serna also addressed the issue
of what type of compensatory language program is an appropriate
43. See, e.g., Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Otero v.
School Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975).
44. See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
45. 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
46. Id. at 1149.
47. Id. There was a bilingual program for preschool and first grade students and an ethnic
studies program in the high schools. Id. at 1150. The school district also asserted that the
trial court improperly interfered in the internal affairs of the school district. Id. at 1154.
48. 351 F. Supp. 1279, 1282-83 (D.N.M. 1972).
49. 499 F.2d at 1152.
50. Id. at 1153.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1154.
[Vol. V
NOTES
remedy. In upholding the district court's implementation of a bilin-
gual/bicultural program, the court of appeals reasoned that "the
trial court had a duty to fashion a program which would provide
adequate relief for Spanish surnamed children. 5 3 In reaching this
conclusion the court of appeals relied on the Supreme Court's state-
ment in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,54 a
school desegregation case in which the Court noted that "[o]nce a
right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and
flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies."5
In Otero v. School District No. 51,56 plaintiffs brought a class
action suit on behalf of Mexican-American students seeking injunc-
tive relief which would have required the defendant school district
to implement a type of the bilingual/bicultural program. Plaintiffs
attributed the substantial dropout rate of these students from
school to their language deficiency in English. 7 The United States
District Court for the District of Colorado held that plaintiffs failed
to establish a basis for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d or the equal
protection clause.5" The district court attributed the poor perform-
ance of the Mexican-American children to their income and social
status rather than their language deficiency.59
In applying the Lau and Serna decisions, the Otero court con-
cluded that these cases required "large numbers" of language mi-
nority students before relief could be granted. 0 The court stated
53. Id.
54. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
55. Id. at 15. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 H.Av. L.
REv. 1281 (1976).
56. 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975).
57. Id. at 164.
58. Id. at 172.
59. Id. at 168. Out of the 628 Mexican-American students tested for English proficiency,
fifty-four had low scores. Id. at 165. These fifty-four students in all cases had English scores
higher than their Spanish scores. Id. at 165-66. In addition, not one of the named plaintiffs
demonstrated a proficiency in Spanish greater than his proficiency in English. Id. at 166. The
school district's expert testified that less than 3 percent of the elementary Mexican-American
students had any proficiency in speaking or comprehending Spanish. Id. at 165. The school
district's expert testified that the poor performance of Chicano students was less severe than
it was nationally, and the court agreed. Id. at 166.
60. Id. at 171.
1977]
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that since only a "few" students were involved, Lau and Serna were
not controlling."
The Otero court also noted that the Lau and Serna decisions
involved school systems which were "making no real effort" to solve
their language minority problems. 2 This additional factor was not
present in Otero; the defendant school district was "making a real,
conscientious effort to recognize, face and solve" its language minor-
ity problems. 3 Therefore, the court refused to grant the requested
relief. 4
Addressing the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, the Otero court
deferred to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Keyes v. School District
No. 1.5 Plaintiffs in Keyes alleged that the defendant school board
had perpetuated and intensified racial segregation within its school
system. The district court held for the plaintiffs, and fashioned a
remedy when it became apparent that the defendant would not
comply with the desegregation order.6 Relying on the Supreme
Court's statement in Swann concerning the scope and flexibility of
a "district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs,"67 it
adopted the Cardenas plan, a version of the bilingual/bicultural
61. Id. According to the expert's testimony presented in Otero, the student population of
defendant's school district was comprised as follows: 89.8 percent of the pupils were Anglos;
2 percent were either black, oriental or Native American; and 8.2 percent were Mexican-
American. Id. at 165. The minority group students were distributed throughout the school
district in the following manner: 6.4 to 9.4 percent were in the three high schools; 6.4 to 11.8
percent were in the six junior high schools; and 1.1 to 30.1 percent were in the nineteen
elementary schools. Id.
62. Id. at 171.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 177. The court did not appear to be particularly sensitive to the plaintiffs'
assertions. One of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses, Dr. Jose Cardenas, a noted educator, was
described by Judge Winner as "[an expert in curriculum, bilingual/bicultural education
and all sorts of other things." Id. at 164-65. This description of professional credentials seems
somewhat casual when contrasted with the terse, more extended descriptions given the pro-
fessional credentials of the experts called by the defendants.
Judge Winner expressed his general concern with recent increases in litigation involving
school policies. He seemed to feel that efforts to expand educational services were being made
on behalf of ungrateful and undeserving students: "I confess that I wonder if school personnel
should not be awarded combat pay for their efforts in trying to educate in today's climate."
Id. at 170 n.3.
65. 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 96 S. Ct. 806 (1976).
66. 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 921 (1973).
67. 380 F. Supp. 673, 683 (D. Colo. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
plan. 8 The district court decided this was necessary to the effective
desegregation of some of the schools."
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district had overstepped
the limits of its powers by instituting the Cardenas plan.0 It rejected
the plaintiffs equal protection argument stating, "Although enlight-
ened educational theory may well demand as much [as the Car-
denas plan], the Constitution does not."'" However, the court of
appeals did leave open the possibility of using some other type of
compensatory language program "to ensure that Hispano and other
minority children will have the opportunity to acquire proficiency
in the English language."72
The Otero court, basing its decision on Keyes, stated: "It is set-
tled, then, that under Tenth Circuit law there is no constitutional
right to bilingual/bicultural education. . ... ,1 Thus, the court de-
clined to accept plaintiffs' argument for a bilingual/bicultural plan
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.7"
IV. Equal Educational Opportunity
The right to an equal educational opprtunity was discussed by the
Supreme Court in the seminal case of San Antonio School District
v. Rodriguez.7" Plaintiffs in Rodriguez were parents of Mexican-
American children who alleged that the Texas system of financing
public education operated to the disadvantage of the poor and im-
pinged upon a fundamental right thereby violating the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.76 Defendant school dis-
trict contended that a legitimate state interest was served by the
Texas plan and, therefore, it should not be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.77
68. 380 F. Supp. at 692.
69. Id.
70. 521 F.2d at 481. The Cardenas Plan is a comprehensive approach to education that
extends to "matters of educational philosophy ... instructional scope, and ... curriculum,
student evaluation, staffing, non-instructional service and community involvement." Id.
71. Id. at 482.
72. Id. at 483.
73. 408 F. Supp. at 170.
74. Id. at 169-70.
75. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See Note, The Right of Handicapped Children to an Education:
The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 519 (1974).
76. 411 U.S. at 4.
77. Id. at 40.
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The Supreme Court concluded that education is not among the
rights afforded protection by the Constitution." It stated that even
if some quantum of education is protected by the Constitution, it
is no more than "the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoy-
ment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political
process."79
This "basic minimal skills" standard as the only requirement of
the equal protection clause was impliedly questioned by Mr. Justice
Douglas in Lau v. Nichols. 80 He reasoned in Lau that there was "no
equality of treatment" when the state imposed standards for gradu-
ation and then foreclosed non-English speaking students from a
meaningful education by providing them with the same curriculum
as English speaking students."' Although the Lau majority did not
reach the equal protection claim, it did imply that language minor-
ity children have a right to equal educational opportunity and plac-
ing them in an English speaking classroom makes "a mockery of
public education. '"82
Class actions brought on behalf of handicapped children have
established their right to compensatory educational programs under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3 In Mills
v. Board of Education,4 seven handicapped children alleged that
defendant school board violated their constitutional rights to an
equal educational opportunity by failing to provide them with edu-
cation suited to their needs and by excluding them from all public
education. 5 The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia found defendants' failure to provide "not just an equal
publicly supported education but all publicly supported education
while providing such education to other children .... ." was a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause as a component of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. 6
78. Id. at 38.
79. Id. at 37.
80. 414 U.S. at 566. See text accompanying notes 19-42 supra.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See 18 VILL. L. REV. 277 (1972).
84. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). See Herr, Retarded Children and the Law: Enforcing
the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 23 SYR. L. REV. 995 (1972).
85. 348 F. Supp. at 868.
86. Id. at 875.
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In Failkowski v. Shapp,7 plaintiffs, multiple handicapped broth-
ers represented by their parents, alleged that defendant school dis-
trict's educational program was in no respect beneficial to them,
and that defendant "did no more than babysit.., because it offered
no training appropriate to their learning capacities." 8 Plaintiffs also
claimed that defendant school board violated their rights under the
equal protection clause because it failed to provide them with a
meaningful education. 9 Defendant school board, on a motion to
dismiss, argued that it was under no obligation to provide a special
education to plaintiffs under the Supreme Court's decision in
Rodriguez.90 The Failkowski court distinguished Rodriguez on its
facts and concluded that although there may not be a right to a
particular level of education, there is a right to some minimum level
of education."
V. Conclusion
In Lau v. Nichols,"2 the Supreme Court established the right of
non-English speaking children to receive compensatory language
instruction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Various lower courts, 3 relying
on Mr. Justice Blackmum's concurring opinion in Lau,94 have re-
stricted this right to situations involving a "substantial" number of
language minority students. Therefore, whether a language minor-
ity child will receive compensatory language instruction will depend
on the fortuitous circumstance of which school he attends.
Arguably, language minority children may analogize their posi-
tion to handicapped children. The constitutional argument which
was successful in Mills" and in Failkowski0 for handicapped chil-
dren might also be successfully argued by language minority chil-
dren. Although the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez held that
87. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
88. Id. at 948.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 957.
91. Id. at 958 (dictum).
92. 414 U.S. 563 (1974); see notes 19-42 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Otero v.
School Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975).
94. 414 U.S. at 572 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
95. See 348 F. Supp. at 875.
96. See 405 F. Supp. at 958-59 (dictum).
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there is no fundamental right to a particular level of education,97 the
Mills" and Failkowskill courts concluded that handicapped children
are entitled to receive a minimal education which is geared to their
needs. Since language minority students may not be able to obtain
a minimal education without compensatory language instruction,
they may be entitled to such instruction.
The Supreme Court should reexamine the rights of language mi-
nority students under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d in order to clarify its hold-
ing in Lau. If compensatory language programs can only be imple-
mented when a "substantial" number of minority children are at-
tending a school system, the Court should adopt this requirement.
On the other hand, explicit rejection of the requirement will prevent
evasion of section 2000d and the HEW guidelines.
97. 411 U.S. at 38.
98. 348 F. Supp. at 878.
99. 405 F. Supp. at 959 (dictum).
